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Abstract
We present a logic to model the behaviour of an agent trusting or not
trusting messages sent by another agent. The logic formalizes trust as a
consistency checking function with respect to currently available informa-
tion. Negative trust is modelled in two forms: distrust as the rejection
of incoming inconsistent information; mistrust, as revision of previously
held information becoming undesirable in view of new incoming inconsis-
tent information, which the agent wishes to accept. We provide a natural
deduction calculus, a relational semantics and prove soundness and com-
pleteness results. We overview a number of applications which have been
investigated for the proof-theoretical formulation of the logic.
1 Introduction
The notion of trust has been central in both epistemology and computing, where
its conceptual definition as well as applications have been explored. For the
former, debates on third-person perspective knowledge, testimony and belief
about other agents’ epistemic states exemplify situations in which trust plays
a role, either explicitly or implicitly. In various areas of the computational sci-
ences, characterizations of trust are used to identify relevant, secure or preferred
sources, channels and contents. A long list of applications can be mentioned
where trust is involved in some form: software management systems and web
certificates, cryptography and authentication protocols, design and analysis of
social networks, data analytics, reputation systems to name some. It seems
therefore obvious to expect logical analyses of trust that can answer the need
for a formal and theoretical foundation in these fields.
An intuitive way of formalizing trust is as a first order relation between
agents in the form trust(A,B). But such a basic translation is ripe with prob-
lematic aspects. First, as debated at large in the computational trust community
and reported in Section 5, trust interpreted as a first order relation between
agents notoriously induces propagation based on transitivity, an undesirable
property in many epistemic and security contexts:
Example 1.1 (Trust Transitivity). If Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Carol,
then Alice trusts Carol.
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2Consider for example security contexts, where authorization relations can-
not be considered to hold transitively across agents. Consider also software
management, where agents are servers holding software repositories and clients:
when desired packages have dependencies across several non-directly authorised
locations, it is usually safe to constrain trusting operations. A variant of the
transitivity property in the definition of trust as first order relation is that it
applies to all contents generated by the trusted sender in a generalised way
(Alice always trusts Bob), and a number of additional strategies need to be
deployed to mitigate such situation, like contextual or situational descriptions.
Note that here a relation of transmission of information is emerging, which can
be preceded by one of access authorization across agents.
Another important problem is the definition of the semantics of negative
trust. A notion of negative trust requires reference to intentions when distin-
guishing between misplacement of trust and betrayal. An intentional charac-
terization of trust distinguishing mistrust from distrust is presented in Primiero
and Kosolosky (2013). Let us consider two examples:
Example 1.2 (Intentionally untrustworthy transmission). Alice receives data
d from Bob; she considers the transmission untrustworthy because she believes
that Bob has sent false data intentionally.
In this form of untrustworthiness attribution, the obvious meaning should
operationally be reflected by a rejection of the received data.
Example 1.3 (Unintentionally untrustworthy transmission). Alice receives data
d from Bob; she considers the transmission trustworthy because she believes Bob
to be sincere (about d); she now considers her data ¬d false, albeit she held such
data unintentionally as true.
In this form of untrustworthiness attribution, the obvious meaning should
operationally be reflected by a rejection of the previously held data.
The combination of negation and transitivity generates the problem of trust
muliplication. Propagation for negative (first-order) trust is formulated as fol-
lows (Jøsang and Pope (2005)):
Example 1.4 (Negative trust Multiplication). If Alice does not trust Bob and
Bob does not trust Carol, then Alice trusts Carol.
A way to avoid the aforementioned problems is to revise the view of trust as
a first order relation between agents, and define it as a second-order property
of first-order relations (e.g. of communication) between agents (Primiero and
Taddeo (2012)):
Definition 1.1 (Trust as a Property). Assume a a first-order relation of in-
formation transmission between Alice and Bob. If Alice chooses to rely on Bob
about the content of the transmission and acts on that basis, then we say that
trust qualifies the first-order relation of information transmission between Alice
and Bob.
3In order to provide a formally viable translation, we formulate trust as a
function that is exercised on a message sent by Bob under the knowledge state
that qualifies Alice (which we call her profile):
(the profile of A) trusts (message− from−B) (1)
In such a system, we refer to trust as a bridging function between the content
that an agent can read from other agents and the content which the agent is
allowed to write (i.e. to make available for reading to other agents). Under this
interpretation, trusting a message means to check its consistency with respect
to the current profile. As a result, we are considering a trust operation that
constrains message passing operations, see Primiero and Raimondi (2014). The
model is currently limited to first-order messages: agents cannot send messages
about messages they trust or distrust.
Definition 1.2 (Trust as Consistency Check Function ). If Alice reads message
φ from Bob and φ is consistent with her profile, Alice trusts φ, i.e. she can add
it to her profile and can write it as a message to other agents.
Consider the following modified example:
Example 1.5 (Intentional Untrust Multiplication). Alice does not trust φ from
Bob: she believes he sends her intentionally false information. Bob does not
trust ¬φ from Carol: he believes she sends him intentionally false information.
Assume Alice is aware of that, should she trust ¬φ from Carol?
The question whether Alice is safe in assuming the original ¬φ to be valid
is now specified more precisely, and the related epistemic action of distrust,
reformulating the previous notion from Definition 1.2, has the following intuitive
semantics:
Definition 1.3 (Distrust). If Alice reads φ from Bob, and φ is inconsistent
with Alice’s profile, Alice distrusts φ and writes ¬φ.
A distinct case for trust misplacement can be formulated as follows:
Example 1.6 (Unintentional Untrust Multiplication). Alice reads φ from Bob,
false in view of her current information: she believes she has unintentionally
held false information ¬φ. Bob has received φ from Carol, who can confirm it
to Alice. Should Alice trust φ from Carol?
This operation has an intuitive semantic meaning which underpins an act of
trust (of the new information) but leads to an act of negative trust (of the old
information held):
Definition 1.4 (Mistrust). If Alice reads φ from Bob, φ is inconsistent with
Alice’s profile and Alice wants to maintain consistency, then she mistrusts ¬φ.
To accept or reject such contradicting information (i.e, to distrust or mistrust
the received information) might depend on the number and role of other agents
available for confirmation, or from selected parameters.
4The aim of the present contribution is to provide a natural deduction cal-
culus and a semantics for these notions of trust and their negative counterpart,
including meta-theoretical soundness and completeness results. In particular,
this article proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we present a generalised version of
the natural deduction calculus (un)SecureND and analyse its structural proper-
ties including normalization under trust preservation; in Section 3 we present a
relational semantics based on filter Kripke models for the calculus; and in Sec-
tion 4 we offer soundness and completeness results. We conclude in Section 5
with an overview of the related literature, compared to the applications studied
so far for (un)SecureND. The Section 6 sets the next steps of this research.
2 The Proof Theory of (un)SecureND
We introduce in this Section the proof theory of (un)SecureND. This calculus
was initially introduced as SecureND in Primiero and Raimondi (2014), with
a basic application to the resolution of problems generated by transitive trust
operations, where one wishes to block trust applications among agents where
consistency is lost, according to a trust function reflecting the intuitive meaning
presented in Definition 1.2. SecureND resolves unintended transitive trust by
requiring explicit localisation of trusted messages in the agents’ profiles, similar
to what suggested in Clarke, Christianson, and Xiao (2009). (un)SecureND
extends the former logic by allowing negation in the language: it was first
introduced in Primiero (2016) and it was aimed at resolving the problem of
untrust multiplication by the definition of functions of mistrust and distrust
according to the intuitive meaning presented in Definitions 1.3 and 1.4.
We start with introducing the language of our logic:
Definition 2.1. (Syntax of (un)SecureND)
S := {A ≤ B ≤ · · · ≤ Ω}
φS := aS | ¬φSi | φSi → φSj | φSi ∧ φSj | φSi ∨ φSj | ⊥ |
Read(φS) |Write(φS) | Trust(φS)
ΓS := {φSi , . . . , φSn}
S is a finite set of agents, ordered by ≤: we use S in the definition above
as a metavariable for any S ∈ S. The expression A ≤ B over S × S intuitively
expresses that agent A has access on agent B’s content. This relation models
therefore only the information access across agents and it says nothing about
the trust that A might express or not over a message she reads from B. The
accessibility relation A ≤ B refers to the authorization that A has to read
the content that agent B issues or produces. Typical examples of this kind of
conditions are expressed by access control systems or organizations where e.g. a
top-down authorization relation on reading messages could be defined. Hence,
this order can be defined according to the requirements of a specific application
and reflects an access policy. Here we simply take a total order over all agents,
while a partial one could be defined, or multiple access order over subsets of
5the whole hierarchy. From a logical viewpoint, this expresses the validity of
formulas expressing the readability of belief bases of agents according the order
relation ≤, but not otherwise. We denote with A ∼ B the case in which A,B
have each access to the other agent’s state.
φS is a metavariable for formulae, defined from a denumerable set of atoms
aA (or possibly a finite one, if allowed by the application context) with their
logical composition inductively defined by connectives, including functions to
read, trust and write, with S here a metavariable for elements in S. Atomic
formulas, aAi says that formula ai is signed by agent A ∈ S, either because
asserted or because it is derived in her profile; for complex formulas, we use the
convention that φAi if and only if a
A
i , for all ai ∈ φi, and otherwise they can be
composed by formulas issued by distinct agents.
The partial order defined over elements S ∈ S allows for branching in the
hierarchy, so that e.g. S < S′ < S′′ and S < S′ < S′′′, i.e. S′′, S′′′ both are
accessible from S′ and transitively from S, but S′′, S′′′ could be unaccessible to
each other. The language includes ⊥ to express conflicts: we formulate ¬φAi as
an abbreviation for φAi → ⊥, meaning that formula φAi induces a contradiction.
A user profile ΓS is the list of all formulas issued by the same agent S. A
judgement ΓS ` φS′ states that a formula φ signed by agent S′ holds in the
context Γ of formulas signed by agent S. A profile is consistent if it prevents
contradictions, i.e. it does not include formulas φS ,¬φS , or formulas φS , ψS
such that ψS implies ¬φS . A formula which does not depend on any other
formula, is derivable under any context, hence a judgement ` φSi says that a
formula φi signed by agent S holds in any context.
Along with standard complex formulas built by negation, implication, con-
junction, disjunction, access formulas are built by three additional operators:
Read(φS) means ”the message φ issued by S is read”; Trust(φS) means ”the
message φ issued by S is trusted”; Write(φS) means ”the message φ issued
by S is written”; for all these formulas, the reading is in the passive form. A
judgdment of the form ΓS ` Read(φS′) (respectively: ΓS ` Trust(φS′) and
ΓS ` Write(φS′)) means ”the message φ issued by S′ is read under the profile
of agent S” (respectively: ”the message φ issued by S′ is trusted under the
profile of agent S”; and ”the message φ issued by S′ is written under the profile
of agent S”).
For all the rules presented below, we assume A ≤ B ≤ C, and that the
instances of such rules are trivially valid for formulas with the same agent’s
index on the left and right side of the turnstile. Profiles are constructed induc-
tively from the empty profile, see Figure 1. Profiles can be extended ΓS ; ΓS
′
=
{φSi , . . . , φSn ;φS
′
n+1}, by the rule Profile Extension, where the semi-colon is
commutative; this formulates a profile composed by formulas φi, . . . , φn issued
by agent S and formula φn+1 issued by agent S
′. When such extension comes
from the same agent, we use a comma: ΓS , φSi . Profile extension by deductive
closure is guaranteed by the rules for → under the same agent’s index.
The operational rules in Figure 2 formulate closure under compositional-
ity by logical connectives. As it is standard in proof-theoretic semantics, the
meaning of our binary (connectives) and unary functions is given by a pair of
6Empty Profile{} : profile
ΓA : profile ` ψBj
Profile Extension
ΓA;ψBj :profile
Figure 1: The System (un)SecureND: Profile Construction Rules
introduction and elimination rules, the former intended to express how a for-
mula with that connective is obtained, the latter how it can be dispensed with.
The rule Atom establishes derivability for any formulas available within the same
profile, or across any profile accessible according to ≤, as reflected by the side
condition expressing validity of the rule for any profile B ≥ A. ⊥ is used to
express inconsistency of a profile, inducing admissibility of any formula, reflect-
ing a form of ex falso sequitur quodlibet. We use implication to ⊥ as a way
to introduce ¬. The introduction rule for conjunction ∧-I allows composition
of formulas from distinct profiles; by the corresponding elimination rule ∧-E,
each composing formula is derivable under the combined profiles. The introduc-
tion rule for disjunction ∨-I says that a combined profile can derive any formula
from each of the composing profiles; by the corresponding elimination ∨-E, each
formula derivable from each individual profile can also be derived from the ex-
tended profile. →-Introduction expresses inference of a formula from a combined
profile as inference between formulas (Deduction Theorem), which reads ”If the
profile of agent A is extended with φi issued by agent B, then φj is issued by
agent C”, and it generalizes the format with a single agent; its elimination→-E
allows to recover such inference as profile extension (Modus Ponens).
We equip the system with a set of rules describing derivability for the access
functions read, trust, write and their negations. This fragment of rules is
presented in Figure 3. read says that from any consistent context ΓA a formula
φBi can be read, provided the access policy is valid; this is expressed by the
side condition which reflects the order relation on users’ profiles. This side
condition can be reformulated as a proper premise in the rule if so required.
trust works as an elimination rule for read: it says that if a formula φBi can
be read under context ΓA and its inclusion preserves profile consistency, then
it can be trusted. write works as an elimination rule for trust: it says that a
readable and trustable formula can be written (made available to other users).
derive allows to reduce the access process to derivability: any formula that is
safely written in a consistent profile can be derived in it.
The following set of rules extend the Trust function by negation. The rules
for Distrust are intended to preserve the current profile in view of conflicting
external information. The Introduction rule for distrust DTrust− I expresses
the following principle: a formula φBi whose reading is inconsistent with the
current context ΓA is untrustworthy, i.e. the rule for trust is not applied.
The corresponding elimination rule DTrust− E uses →-introduction: it derives
any formula ψCj which is consistent with the profile in which access to the
7ΓA; ΓB : profile
Atom, for any ψBi ∈ ΓB , s.t.B ≥ A
ΓA; ΓB ` ψBi
ΓA ` φB → ⊥ ⊥, for any B ∈ S
ΓA ` ¬φB
ΓA ` φAi ΓB ` φBj ∧-I
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∧ φBj
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∧ φBj
r-∧-E
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∧ φBj ∧-E
ΓA; ΓB ` φBj
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi
r-∨-I
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∨ φBj
ΓA; ΓB ` φBj
l-∨-I
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∨ φBj
ΓA; ΓB ` φAi ∨ φBj φIi/j ` ψCk ∨-E
ΓA; ΓB ` ψCk
ΓA;φBi ` φCj →-I
ΓA ` φBi → φCj
ΓA ` φBi → φCj ΓA ` φBi →-E
ΓA;φBi ` φCj
Figure 2: The System (un)SecureND: Operational Rules
conflicting formula φBi is blocked. The rules for Mistrust are intended to modify
the current user profile to accommodate conflicting external information. To do
so, the removal of one or possibly more currently derivable formulas is necessary.
The Introduction rule for mistrust MTrust− I expresses the following principle:
given a formula ψBi whose reading is inconsistent with the current context Γ
A,
identify the subset ∆A ⊆ ΓA by removal of formula φAj in ΓA so that the
profile is still a valid one when ψBi is added to it. In the new profile ∆
A, the
formula φAj generating inconsistency with ψ
B
i is not trusted. To reach such a
∆A ⊆ ΓA which allows to trust ψBi , it is possible that several iteration of the
MTrust− I have to be applied, and more than one formula be removed. The
corresponding elimination rule MTrust− E expresses the following procedure:
given a consistent profile resulting from removal of a formula and addition of a
previously inconsistent one ψBi , identify the set of formulas from profiles higher
than the one of B (if any) which are consistent with ψBi , and possibly required
to confirm trust in the latter.
By the latter set of rules, Distrust is a flag for preventing admissibility of
conflicting external information, while Mistrust is a flag for facilitating removal
8read, for any φBi ∈ ΓB , s.t.B ≥ A
ΓA ` Read(φBi )
ΓA ` Read(φBi ) ΓA;φBi : profile
trust
ΓA ` Trust(φBi )
ΓA ` Read(φBi ) ΓA ` Trust(φBi )
write
ΓA `Write(φBi )
ΓA `Write(φBi )
derive
ΓA ` φBi
ΓA ` Read(φBi )→ ⊥
DTrust− I
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi )
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi ) ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi )→ ψCj
DTrust− E
ΓA `Write(ψCj )
ΓA ` Read(ψBi )→ ⊥ ∆A;ψBi : profile MTrust− I, with ∆A ⊆ ΓA 3 φAj → ¬ψBi
∆A;ψBi ` ¬Trust(φAj )
∆A;ψBi ` ¬Trust(φAj ) ΓC ;ψBi : profile
MTrust− E, ∀C ≤ B
∆A; ΓC ` Trust(ψBi )
Figure 3: The System (un)SecureND: Access Rules
of conflicting formulas present in the current installation profile. For negated
trust, double negation elimination does not hold: from ¬¬Trust(φ) one can-
not infer Trust(φ), as it depends on the choice of negated trust rules applied,
DTrust − E or MTrust − E. In particular, note that this semantics is non-
deterministic with respect to which rule to apply in the presence of a derived
formula ΓA ` Read(ψBi )→ ⊥. The choice might be determined by the ranking
of the agents: in the case of an agent highest in the ranking, distrust will always
be the standard protocol; for an agent reading from higher sources, mistrust
will always be the standard protocol. Otherwise, the choice of which negative
trust protocol to select can be contextually defined. The order of negated trust
operations is also relevant and the choice is not always open. Consider two
scenarios.
Example 2.1. At some step of a derivation tree the following rule occurs:
9∆A;ψBi ` ¬Trust(φAj ) ΓC ;ψBi : profile
MTrust− E,∀C ≤ B
∆A; ΓC ` Trust(ψBi ) ∆A; ΓC ` Read(φDi )
∆A; ΓC ` ¬Trust(φDi )
where ψBi → ¬φBi . In this case, a second mistrust operation would be impossible
as there are no agents higher than D who have a base consistent with φ. Consider
now a second different scenario as follows:
ΓB ` ¬Trust(φCj ) ΓB ` ¬Trust(φCj )→ ψCj
DTrust− E
ΓB `Write(ψCi )
followed by:
ΓB ` Read(¬ψA)→ ⊥ ∆B ;¬ψA : profile
MTrust− I,∀A ≤ B
∆B ;¬ψA ` ¬Trust(φB) ΓA;¬ψA : profile
∆B ; ΓA ` Trust(¬ψA)
where ψBi → ¬φCi and ∆B ⊆ ΓB. Here the choice between the contradictory
formulas allows an alternation between distrust and mistrust, as the sources
from which information is received is consistent with such procedure.
Example 2.2. Another scenario which shows the dynamics of mistrust and
distrust is illustrated as follows: consider two mistrustful agents exchanging
messages with each other, e.g. two partners A ∼ B, each with low self-esteem
and high reliance on the other. In this scenario the first agent to receive a
message from the other will accept it
ΓA ` Read(φB)→ ⊥ ∆A;φB : profile
MTrust− I
∆A;φB ` ¬Trust(¬φA)
It is then entirely possible that a message from another source C < A ∼ B
will contradict the previous message:
∆A ` Read(¬φC)→ ⊥ ∆′A;¬φC : profile
∆
′A;¬φC ` ¬Trust(φA) ∆′A;¬φC ` Trust(¬φA)
∆
′A `Write(¬φC)
As a consequence everyone’s content could be restored:
ΓB ` Read(¬φC)→ ⊥ ∆B ;¬φC : profile
∆B ;¬φC ` ¬Trust(φB)
10
ΓA `Write(φAi ) ΓA ` Trust(φBj )
Weakening
ΓA;φBj `Write(φAi )
ΓA, φAi ;φ
B
i `Write(ψAk )
Contraction
ΓA, φAi `Write(ψAk )
ΓA, φAi , φ
A
j `Write(φAk )
Exchange
ΓA, φAj , φ
A
i `Write(φAk )
ΓA ` φBi ΓB , φBi ` φBj
Cut
ΓA; ΓB ` φBj
Figure 4: The System (un)SecureND: Structural Rules
2.1 Structural Rules
Structural rules for (un)SecureND hold with restrictions, as illustrated in Figure
4. They all hold under the assumption that A ≤ B and in particular for the
Weakening rule, an instance of the trust rule is explicitly required. As a result,
the system qualifies as substructural, see e.g. Restall (2000).
Weakening usually is formulated as to guarantee that consistency of a de-
rived formula is not affected by adding assumptions; in order for this to work,
we need to guard profiles against conflicting extensions. Hence, the rule is con-
strained by an instance of trust: it says that a valid derivation of φAi in the
profile ΓA is preserved under a profile extension in view of formula φBj if and
only if such formula is trustworthy, i.e. one extending consistently the current
profile. Contraction normally expresses the principle that copies can be safely
ignored, as the information they provide is already available. Under our inter-
pretation, profiles are ordered by the corresponding order on agents. Hence,
Contraction requires a constrained to preserve such dependencies: it says that
a valid formula φAk is preserved when removing one instance of two identical
formulas φAi ;φ
B
i , provided one preserves the fromula from the agent higher in
the order (if one exists), so as to guarantee that any further dependency below is
preserved. Exchange holds usually for set of formulas, where no order is present
and it expresses the principle that formula derivability is preserved across sets
of assumptions in which two formulas are swapped. In the present language,
the rule is constrained by the ordered structure of agents’ profiles: it says that
a valid derivation of φAk is preserved under reorder of formulas φ
A
i , φ
A
j coming
from the same agent A. Finally, the Cut rule expresses valid derivation under
profile extension, and it holds under the order relation of access A ≤ B being
preserved: if a formula φBi is valid under profile Γ
A and a profile ΓB including
φBi allows deriving a formula φ
B
j , then assuming A ≤ B the extended profile
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ΓA; ΓB allows derivation of φBj . We show here the admissibility of this rule for
the most relevant cases:
– for φBi ≡ ¬Trust(φBj ): consider the first premise of the rule to be the
conclusion of a DTrust− I rule, then the whole rule collapses in a form of
DTrust− E rule, where φBj is any formula consistent with the removal of
φBi ;
– for φBi ≡ ¬Trust(φAi ): consider the first premise of the rule to be the
conclusion of a MTrust− I rule, then ΓA ≡ ΓA\{φAi };ψBj for some formula
ψBj for which access is desired; then the second premise of the Cut rule is
an instance of DTrust− I. The conclusion illustrates then the situation
presented in Figure 5, valid for all C < B.
ΓA \ {φAi };ψBj ` ¬Trust(φAi ) ΓC ;¬Trust(φAi ) ` ξCk
Cut
ΓA \ {φAi };ψBj ; ΓC ` ξCk
Figure 5: An instance of the Cut Rule
This instance of the rule shows that any formula ξCk which is valid under
a profile ΓC ;¬Trust(φAi ) which mistrusts a given formula φAi , will be
preserved by any consistent extension of the profile ΓA \ {φAi };ψBj ; ΓC ,
and this should be preserved for any further profile containing formulas
accessible from the highest profile A in the order.
Theorem 2.2 (Cut-Elimination Theorem). Any (un)SecureND derivation with
an occurrence of the Cut rule can be transformed into another derivation with
the same end sequent without Cut using only Weakening and Trust.
Proof. By induction on the derivationD which is the redex of the cut-elimination.
The standard proof holds for the logical rules. We consider here the specific cases
for the last step being obtained by an access rule or a ⊥ rule (for the specific
instance of the (un)trust rules).
1. The left premise of the cut rule is the conclusion of ⊥, then cut is of the
form:
ΓA ` φB → ⊥
ΓA ` ¬φB ∆B ,¬φB ` ψB
Cut
ΓA; ∆B ` ψB
then also ΓA ` Trust(¬φB) holds and the conclusion can be obtained
from the second premise by Weakening.
2. The right premise of Cut is the conclusion of ⊥, then Cut is of the form:
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ΓA ` ¬φB
∆B ` φB → ⊥
∆B ,¬φB ` ψB
Cut
ΓA; ∆B ` ψB
then if ψB ∈ ∆B , ΓA; ∆B ` ψB is from Atom; if ψB = ¬φB then ΓA ` ψB
and ΓA; ∆B ` ψB is obtained by Weakening.
3. The left premise of Cut includes a read operation, then cut requires a
detour through trust of the form:
ΓA ` Read(φB) ΓA, φB : profile
ΓA ` Trust(φB) ∆B , φB ` ψB
Cut
ΓA; ∆B ` ψB
then the conclusion is obtained from the second premise by Weakening.
4. The right premise of Cut includes a read operation, then cut requires a
detour through trust of the form:
ΓA ` φB
∆B , φB ` Read(ξC) ∆B , ξC : profile
∆B ` Trust(ξC)
Cut
ΓA; ∆B ` Trust(ξC)
so the conclusion is obtained again from the second premise by Weakening.
5. The left premise of Cut is the conclusion of write, then cut is of the form:
ΓA ` Read(φB) ΓA ` Trust(φB)
ΓA `Write(φB)
ΓA ` φB ∆B , φB ` ψB
Cut
ΓA; ∆B ` ψB
then again the conclusion is obtained by Weakening from the second
premise.
6. The right premise of Cut is the conclusion of write, then cut is of the
form:
ΓA ` φB
∆B , φB ` Read(ξC) ∆B , φB ` Trust(ξC)
∆B ;φB `Write(ξC)
Cut
ΓA; ∆B `Write(ξC)
then the conclusion is obtained again by Weakening from the second
premise.
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3 Relational Semantics for (un)SecureND
A relational semantics appropriate for the calculus (un)SecureND can be for-
mulated in terms of an interpretation of the accessibility relations on worlds. In
this context, the meaning of the access rules for read, trust, write express con-
ditions on those accessibility relations. To distinguish between the information
held by agents, and the access operations across agent’s states, we will denote
the former as local states, and to information validated across distinct agents
as global states. These states are defined below respectively by associated satis-
faction relations in Definitions 3.2 and 3.5. The conditions of access operations
have the following informal meanings:
– for read: a local state βi for an agent B is accessible from a local state αj
for an agent A if and only if A is authorized to access information from B
and the information available at βi is issued by B at a time earleier or at
most as late as the time of state αj for agent A.
– for trust: the same condition as for read, with the addition that the
information available at βi is consistent with the information available at
αj .
– for write: the same condition as for trust, with the addition that the
information available at αj becomes visible at successive states of any
authorised agent.
– for dtrust: the failure of the additional consistency requirement on the
trust condition and hence the impossibility to add the visibility condition
given by write.
– for mtrust: the failure of the additional consistency requirement on the
trust condition, followed by the removal on the visibility condition given
by write on the locally available information.
A major difference of the semantics with respect to the proof theory is that the
former makes it explicit the temporal order among agents’ states, which only
remains implicit in the latter, in the form of occurrence of judgements at given
steps of a derivation tree. In this section, we spell out the formal details of this
semantics.
Throughout we assume a denumerable set of atomic proposition AP =
{a, b, c, . . . } (or finite, if allowed and required by the context of application).
We define a model as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Relational Model).
M = 〈A,≤,ΛA∈A,, αn, ω1, UΛI,...,J , v〉
such that:
1. A := {A,B,Γ, . . . ,Ω} is a finite set of agents.
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2. ≤⊆ A×A is a partial relation over A. When A ≤ B, we say that A has
authorized access to B’s information, hence expressing a ranking. This
relation is reflexive, but we do not assume in general that ≤ is symmetric,
while transitivity is conditional on trust (see Definition 3.5).
3. ΛI∈A := {λ1, . . . , λn} is a finite set of states for each agent I ∈ A, and
i, . . . , n ∈ N. We use the convention that αi is used to denote the ith local
state of agent A ∈ A.
4. ⊆ ΛA × ΛB (with possibly A = B) is the total temporal relation over
local states of agents A,B. When αi  βj, we say that the information
holding at state αi is issued at a time earlier or equivalent to the time at
βj. This relation is assumed to be reflexive, transitive and serial.
5. a designated state αn representing the latest state of the highest ranked
agent (i.e. the agent with the most authorized access over other agents).
6. a designated state ω1 representing the earliest state of the lowest ranked
agent (i.e. the agent with the least authorized access over other agents).
7. UΛA,...,Ω := ΛA × · · · ×ΛΩ is the Cartesian Product of the sets ΛI∈A. We
call such set a universe of states, and its elements global states. For brevity
of notation, in the following UΛI is denoted by U I and UΛA,...,Ω is denoted
by UA. Note that: the maximal set UΛA,...,Ω includes all formulas up to
the latest temporal state of the most authorized agent that are satisfied in
the Filter Model by Global Satisfaction, and its cardinality is denoted by
1; the minimal set UΩ includes only formulas up to the earliest temporal
state of the least authorized agent that are satisfied in the Model by Local
Satisfaction, and its cardinality is denoted by min. Note that at each state
we account only for the formulas valid in that state by the agent and, as
mentioned above, this can be constrained to a finite set of propositional
variables of interest, further constrained by the signature of the agent.
8. v : AP → UA is the labelling function. Intuitively v(aA) identifies the set
of states in UA where a indexed by agent A holds. Despite the fact that
a selection of states in UA,...,Ω might not present an hereditary function
v with respect to ≤, that is, αi ∈ v(aA) and βi ≤ αi is not enough to
establish βi ∈ v(aA), we show that a final selection on the model always
satisfies the hereditary condition.
In the semantics we define the local satisfaction relation as the evaluation of
formulas within an agent’s A set of states
Definition 3.2 (Local Satisfaction). Given a (un)SecureND formula φ and a
model as above, we define the satisfaction of φ at a local state αi for an agent
A by induction as follows:
– αi  aA iff αi ∈ v(aA)
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– αi  > for every αi
– αi  ⊥ never
– αi  φA ∨ ψA iff ∃αh  αi such that αh  φA or αh  ψA
– αi  φA ∧ ψA iff αi  φA and αi  ψA
– αi  φA → ψA iff ∃αj  αi ∈ ΛA, such that αj = {Cn(αi ∪ φA)} and
αj  ψA
According to this definition, an atom is satisfied at a local state if it is in
the set of valuations at that state; every local state is consistent and never
inconsistent. A disjunction is satisfied at a local state if there is an earlier
local state for the same agent such that either one or the other disjunct is
satisfied at that state; a conjunction is satisfied at a local state if both conjuncts
are satisfied at that state. Note both conjunction and disjunction rely on the
temporal relation, as follows: the latter admits any previously held content to
satisfy a disjunction, including content at the current state; the former looks at
the current state only, where hereditary validity of formulas is preserved. An
implication is satisfied at a local state if at some next local state the set of valid
formulas is in the consequence set of the union set of the current state and the
antecedent of the implication, then and at that next state the consequent of
the implication must be satisfied. The negation connective is defined in terms
of implication and ⊥. Note that αi  1 if and only if αi ≡ αn, i.e. the set of
satisfied formulas has the largest cardinality if the local state of evaluation is the
designated state of the most authorised agent at its latest temporal state; and
αi  min if and only if αi ≡ ω1, i.e. the set of satisfied formulas has the least
cardinality if the designated state of evaluation is that of the least authorised
agent at its earliest temporal state.
The notion of satisfiability corresponds to validity in the local states of any
given agent:
Definition 3.3 (Satisfiability). A formula φAi is true in a model M, denoted
M  φAi if and only if αi ∈ UA  φAi for every αi  α1 ∈ UA.
The relation of local satisfaction is monotonic, i.e. if αi ∈ v(φA), for all
αj  αi it holds αj ∈ v(φA). Given αn denotes the the maximally consistent
set of formulas for agent A, it follows that if ` φAi then φAi ∈ αn.
When extending a local state by a local state by a distinct agent, it is con-
ceivable that they might include contradictory formulas. In the following, when
validating an instance of a distrust or mistrust operation, the monotonicity of
the model requires that some local states be dismissed in view of incoming con-
tradictory information, in order to preserve global monotonicity. The dismissed
states from the model can be states of the sender (distrust) as well as of the
receiver (mistrust). In either case, an operation of filtering out these states from
the model is required. The notion of filter model satisfies this requirement:
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Definition 3.4 (Filter Model). A filter model M′ of M is a structure con-
structed according to Definition 3.1 such that UA ∈M′ is obtained by UA ∈M
by a new selection in ΛA×· · ·×ΛΩ. Such selection of states and the addition of
possibly new local states in UA results from the Global Satisfaction Relation in
Definition 3.5. Filter models of a given class are defined as those which select
the same subset from UA ∈M.
A global satisfaction is defined across distinct agents in A for the access
rules:
Definition 3.5 (Global Satisfaction). Given an (un)SecureND formula φ, a
filter model as by Definition 3.4 above and the notion of local satisfaction it
inherits, we define global satisfaction of φ at a state αi for an agent A in a
universe UA by induction as follows:
– αi ∈ UA  Read(φB) iff
1. A ≤ B and
2. ∃βi ∈ UA s.t. βi  αi and
3. βi  φB
– αi ∈ UA  Trust(φB) iff
1. A ≤ B and
2. ∃βi ∈ UA s.t. βi  αi and
3. βi  φB and
4. ∃αj ∈ UA s.t. αi  αj and
5. αj = {Cn(α ∪ {φB})}
– αi ∈ UA Write(φB) iff
1. A ≤ B and
2. ∃βi ∈ UA s.t. βi  αi and
3. βi  φB and
4. ∃αj ∈ UA s.t. αi  αj and
5. αj = {Cn(αi ∪ {φB})} and
6. ∃αk ∈ UA s.t. αj  αk and
7. αk  φA
– αi ∈ UA  DTrust(φB) iff
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1. A ≤ B and
2. ∃βi ∈ UA s.t. βi  αi and
3. βi  φB and
4. ∃αj ∈ UA s.t. αi  αj and
5. αi = {Cn(αj ∪ {¬φB})}
– βi ∈ UA MTrust(φB) iff
1. ∃βh  βi s.t. βh  φB and
2. B ≤ A and
3. ∃αi ∈ UA s.t. βi  αi and
4. αi  ¬φB
5. ∃βj ∈ UA s.t. βi  βj and
6. βj = {Cn(βi \ {φB})}
According to these definitions, a local state αi for an agent A in a given
universe UA:
– can read φ from B if and only if A is higher in the hierarchy of accesses
than B, and there is a state for B in the same universe at which φ holds
and is temporally anterior to the state for A; item can trust φ from B if
and only if it can read it and it is consistent in at least one posterior state;
– can write φ from B if and only if it can read it, trust it and relabel it so
that it is satisfied in at least one posterior state;
– distrusts φ from B if and only if it can read it, but there is a posterior state
in the same universe in which φ is not consistent with the consequences
of the information held;
– mistrusts φ on its own state if and only if can read ¬φ from a successive
state and so extends its own state to remove φ from its consequence set.
The notion of satisfiability is generalised in a universe of local state as truth in
a given class of filter models:
Definition 3.6 (Validity). A formula φAi is valid in a class of filter models,
denoted M′  φAi , if and only if αi ∈ UA  φAi for every αi  ω1 and every UA
in that class.
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4 Meta-Theory
The main results of this Section are proofs of soundness and completeness. In
order to obtain them, we need to list conditions on models of our semantics.
These conditions express a basic global monotonicity property for canonical
models; the last two conditions express a global non-monotonicity property,
which is accounted for in terms of canonical filter models below.
Definition 4.1 (Conditions on Models). In the following, we assume a universe
U i of local states appearing in the relevant condition:
c0. If αi ∈ v(φA) and αi  αj, then αj ∈ v(φA). [Local Monotonicity]
c1. If βi  αn and A ≤ B ≤ Γ then ∃γi  βi  αn. [Temporality Order over
Access]
c2. If Ω ≤ Ξ, then ω1 ≺ ξi  αn and ξi ≺ ω1  αn. [Minimality]
c3. If A ≤ B ≤ Γ and γi  δj  k, then ∃ξi, ξj s.t. αi  δj  ξi and
βi  δj  ξj and Ξ ≤ E. [Implicative Closure]
c4. If A < B and A = B then B < A [Reflexive Access].
c5. If A ≤ B, βi  βj and βj  αi, then βi  αi [Transitivity over Local
Accesses].
c6. If βi  βj and ω1  βj  αn, ∃γj s.t. γj  βj  αj and ω1  βi  γj
[Continuous Alternative Temporal Paths].
c7. ∀αi.∃αj s.t. αi  αj [Temporal Seriality]
c8. A ≤ B ≤ · · · ≤ Ω implies ∃αi, βi such that βi  αi [Instantiation].
c9. ∃Ω such that A ≤ Ω < M implies A ≤M < Ω. [Finality]
c10. ∃A such that A ≤ N , for all N . [Primality]
c11. If A < B and βi  αi ≺ αj and αj ≺ αi, then βi  αj  αi. [Temporal
Equivalence of Local States]
c12. A ≤ B ≤ Γ and γi  βi imply γi  αi [Extension of Temporal States by
Access].
c13. A ≤ B ≤ · · · ≤ M , A ≤ Γ ≤ Ξ, A ≤ ∆ ≤ Ξ, and µj  δj  γj imply
∃ξi, ξj such that µj  ξi  ξj  βj  αj. [Alternative Temporal Accesses]
c14. A ≤ B ≤ · · · ≤M and M ≤ N ≤ · · · ≤ Ω imply ∃T s.t. B ≤ N ≤ · · · ≤ T
and A ≤ T ≤ · · · ≤ Ω. [Compactness on Order Decomposition]
c15. If A ≤ B ≤ . . .Ω and A ≤ B ≤ . . .M , then ∃T,Υ s.t. A ≤ B ≤ . . .M ≤
. . . T and T ≤ Υ ≤ . . .Ω. [Compactness on Order Composition]
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c16. A ≤ B and αi  βi  αj imply αi  αj. [Temporal Contraction]
c17. A ≤ B, βi  αj, βi ∈ v(φB) and αi /∈ v(¬φA) ∀αi  αj imply αj ∈ v(φA).
[Global Monotonicity]
c18. A ≤ B, βi  αj, βi ∈ v(φB), and αj /∈ v(φA) imply ∃αj  αi s.t.
αi ∈ v(¬φA), imply . [Local Monotonicity by Distrust]
c19. B ≤ A, βi  αi, αi /∈ v(φA), βi ∈ v(φB) imply ∃αj  αi s.t. αj ∈ v(φA).
[Local Non-Monotonicity by Mistrust]
Local Monotonicity is guaranteed for any local state with no access to other
agents: in such condition, an agent A who holds φi true at some state, will hold
it at any other state.
Temporality Order over Access establishes that there is always a temporal
order matching the authorization access, with a latest local state for the agent
with most authorization: this condition is made valid simply by the two desig-
nated states in the model.
Minimality guarantees that if the least authorised agent has access to some
other agent’s states, then there are temporal states of each that make their
states accessible from one another and both are accessible from the latest state
of the most authorized agent (i.e. the designated state αn).
Implicative Closure guarantees closure of the temporal order over accessible
states of agents.
Reflexive Access is valid for symmetrically accessible identical states.
Transitivity over Local Accesses grants transitivity of the temporal order
over authorised accesses across agents.
Continuous Alternative Temporal Paths guarantees that given a local tempo-
ral path between the two designated states (earliest with minimal access, latest
with most access), there is always a local state that connects them.
Temporal Seriality is the equivalent of the seriality axioms for normal modal
logic: for every temporal local state there is a later one within that local state.
Instantiation guarantees that for each agents there are temporal states sat-
isfying the order imposed by the authorizations.
Finality establishes the existence in the model of one agent which admits
overall access to its states from other agents. This will be the agent whose
earlier state is the designated ω1.
Primality establishes the existence in the model of one agent with overall
access to all other local states. This will be the agent whose latest state is the
designated αn.
Temporal Equivalence of Local States establishes that global access is pre-
served by by exchanging equivalent local local states.
Extension of Temporal States by Access says that access across agents’ states
implies a temporal order over such states.
Alternative Temporal Accesses states the existence of a temporally compact
access across two alternative series of states that give access to the same local
state.
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Compactness on Order Decomposition states that given two access orders
with some common term, there must be one at least local states that makes
their chaining compact.
Compactness on Order Composition states that given an access order and
a subchain of it, is it possible to identify two sets of local states in it that
decompose the access in two compact chains of access with a shared set of local
states.
Temporal Contraction states that given two temporal states of the same
agent ordered through an external state, there is always a way to establish the
temporal order among them.
Global Monotonicity is guaranteed between local states when the earliest one
satisfies the content of the agent with the most access.
Local Monotonicity by Distrust expresses the dynamic of distrust as an access
condition on temporal local states.
Local Non-Monotonicity by Mistrust expresses the dynamic of mistrust as
an access condition on temporal local states.
We first show that a derivation constructs formulas that are true in some
class of models, according to a filter obtained by some non-monotonic condition
which needs resolution:
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness). If a judgement ΓA ` ψBj is provable in (un)SecureND,
then it is true in all filter models of a given class.
Proof. First, we demonstrate when the following condition holds for all formulas
ψNj :
* If UA ⊇ {γi  βi  αi}, γi ` ψNj and βi ` ψNj and A ≤ B ≤ Γ, then
αi ` ψNj .
The proof proceeds by induction, with the cases for connectives requiring the
conditions above to be restricted over one agent’s domain according to the
Definition 3.2 of Local Satisfaction, reflected in the conditions for models if
condition [c17] is preserved:
l1 Use condition c1 iff ψNj ≡ 1.
l2 Use condition c2 iff ψNj ≡ min.
l3 Use condition c3 iff ψNj ≡ φNi → ξNj .
l4 Use conditions c4− c6 iff ψNj ≡ φNi ∨ ξNj .
l5 The formula ψNj ≡ φNi ∧ ξNj reduces to atomic instances of the two con-
juncts.
For access rules generalised to a universe according to Definition 3.5 of Global
Satisfaction, condition [c17] could be upheld: then if [∗] fails, the formula at hand
is an instance of distrust or mistrust; in either case, the following respectively
must hold:
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** If UA ⊇ {γi  βi  αi}, γi ` ψNj and βi ` ψNj and A ≤ B ≤ Γ, and
αi 0 ψNj , then ∃ψ′Aj s.t. αi ` ψ′Aj and γi  βi ` ψ′Aj .
*** If UA ⊇ {γi  βi  αi}, γi ` ψNj and βi ` ψNj and A ≤ B ≤ Γ, and
αi 0 ψNj , then ∃ψ′Aj s.t. αj 0 ψ′Aj and γi  βi  αi  αj .
Then corresponding conditions on models are as follows:
g1 Use any of the required previous conditions, with the appropriate inverse
order on  for read(ψNj ).
g2 Use any of the required previous conditions, the appropriate inverse order
on , and satisfaction of condition c0 for trust(ψNj ).
g3 Use any of the required previous conditions, the appropriate inverse order
on , condition c0 and condition c8 for write(ψNj ).
g4 On the basis of failing condition c17 which expresses dtrust(ψNj )-intro,
use conditions c18 and c8 for dtrust(ψNj )-elimination.
g5 On the basis of failing condition c17 which expresses dtrust(ψNj )-intro,
use conditions c19 and c8 for mtrust(ψNj )-elimination.
Now we can prove the validity of initial formulas of (un)SecureND and the
preservation by its rules. Suppose ΓA = {φA1 , . . . , φAn }, then if the judgement
ΓA ` ψBj is valid in all models, it must be the case that for every αi ∈ UA it
holds αi ∈ UA ` {φA1 , . . . , φAn } → ψBj . Note that for B 6= A, (∗) and conditions
for the access rules are always required, while for B = A, only conditions on the
operational rules are needed.
– If Γ = ∅, Profile Extension corresponds to the identity judgement ψBj →
ψBj , which follows from c4 and c8.
– For the Atom Rule, ψBj ≡ φAi , for some φAi ∈ ΓA, which then follows from
c4.
– For the ⊥ rule, condition c0 fails for some φAi ∈ ΓA; use c9 to imply any
order;
– ∧-I requires no specific conditions besides c0; ∧-E preserves c0;
– ∨-I requires conditions c8–c10; ∨-E requires condition c13;
– for →-I, use condition c14; for →-E, use conditions c10 and c15;
– ⊥ follows from c0;
– read follows from ∗ and c8;
– trust follows from ∗, c0;
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– write follows from ∗, c0 and c8;
– derive follows from write;
– If a formula introduced by DTrust-I is valid by c18 and ∗∗, the negated
atom is valid for DTrust-E by c21 and the appropriate conditions for
write;
– If a formula introduced by MTrust-I is valid by c19 and ∗∗∗, the negated
atom is valid for DTrust-E by c23 and the appropriate conditions for
write;
– Weakening follows from c11− c12, assuming ∗ and c0;
– Contraction from c8, c10 and c16;
– Exchange from c8 and c11;
– Cut from c4, c5, c16.
Definition 4.3 (Canonical Model). Let ΓA ` φBj be a judgement of (un)SecureND.
A canonical model of (un)SecureND for ΓA ` φBj is the structure
M = 〈A,≤,ΛA∈A,, αn, ω1, UΛA,...,Ω , v〉
as in Definition 3.1 where
1. A is a non-empty set of agents corresponding to S in (un)SecureND;
2. ΛA for each A ∈ A is non-empty;
3. ∀A,B ∈ A, A ≤ B holds iff so is in S and ∃αi ∈ ΛA, βj ∈ ΛB such that
βj  αi;
4. αn ∈ ΛA and ω1 ∈ ΛΩ;
5. UA ⊂ ΛA × · · · × ΛΩ;
6. for all φAi s.t. αi ∈ v(φAi ), then for all βj  αi and A ≤ B, it holds
βj ∈ v(φBj );
7. for all φBi s.t. βj ∈ v(φBi ), then for all αi  βj, A ≤ B and αi ∈
v(trust(φBi )) it holds αi ∈ v(φAi );
A canonical model is one that satisfies exactly all conditions c0 − c17 from
Definition 4.1: this means that a Standard Model is one that does not require
any instance of Mistrust or Distrust operation, as all local satisfaction operations
are monotonic with respect to the global satisfaction relation. In the Definition:
the first clause establishes the set of agents as they occur in the proof-theory;
the second clause defines their local states; the third clause establishes that the
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order across agents in the model is the same as those in the derivations, and that
for every local state of each agent the accessibility relation matches the temporal
relation, i.e. an agent with higher position in the accessibility relation will have
information issued at states that are later or equivalent to the states of agent
with lower position in the order; in the fourth clause, the latest state of the agent
with highest access is the designated state with most access, and the earliest
state of the agent with lowest access is the designated state with least access; by
the fifth clause, the universe is the Cartesian product of all the local states of all
agents; according to the sixth clause, monotonicity of the satisfaction relation
in the model holds across local states of agents accessible from higher to lower
position in the order relation; according to the seventh clause, a trust relation
holds across local states of agents accessible from lower to higher position in
the order relation. Hence, a canonical model is the maximally consistent set of
formulas generated by local models accessing each other, when no filtering is
required.
When the global monotonicity condition fails, a canonical model can be
obtained as a filter model by satisfying also conditions [c18 − c19]: this means
that some states in the model are removed (by either a mistrust or distrust
operation) to restore monotonicity according to conditions ∗∗ or ∗ ∗ ∗.
Definition 4.4 (Canonical Filter Model). A canonical filter modelM′ of (un)SecureND
for ΓA ` φBj is the structure obtained by a canonical model M where for all φBi
s.t. βi ∈ v(φBi ), then for all αi  βi, A ≶ B and αi ∈ v(trust(¬φAi )), it holds
1. either βi /∈ UA and ∃βj  βi s.t. βj ∈ v(trust(¬φAi ))
2. or αi /∈ UA and ∃αj  βi s.t. αj ∈ v(φBj ).
The canonical filter model restores monotonicity by satisfying one of two
conditions:
1. for distrust by agent A: removing a local state βi from the lower ranked,
receiving agent B, validating a formula φ which is not trusted by another
higher agent A; adding a state βj validating such formula;
2. for mistrust by agent A: by removing a local state from a higher agent
A, adding a later one which validates the formula received from a lower
ranked agent B.
Lemma 4.5 (Truth Lemma). LetM′ be a canonical filter model for (un)SecureND
such that UA ∈M′. Then for αn ∈ UA and every formula φAi ,
φAi ∈ αn ↔M′ |= φAi
Proof. By induction on the structure of φAi . Let us start considering the simple
cases of connectives (corresponding to the Operational Rules in (un)SecureND)
within a given local state:
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– It holds trivially if φAi is an atomic proposition or ⊥: this follows by the
first clause in the Definition 3.2 of Local Satisfaction, Definition 3.3 and
condition c0 of Local Monotonicity in Definition 4.1, so that φAi ∈ αi for
each αi ∈ UA.
– If φAi is a disjunction, it holds by definition of the connective, i.e. by
atomic reduction to a previous state αh  αn ∈ UA and condition c0 of
Local Monotonicity.
– If φAi is a conjunction, it holds by definition of the connective, i.e. by
atomic reduction to the current state αn.
– If φAi is of the form φ
A
j → φAk : assume φAj → φAk ∈ αn, by definition of the
designated state αn  αj ∈ UA and αj ∈ UA |= φAj ; then αn ∈ UA |= φAk
and hence M′ |= φAk ; as αj is an arbitrary anterior state of αn, M′ |=
φAj → φAk . Assume now that αn ∈ UA 2 φAj → φAk : by deductive closure
it must be the case that Cn(αj ∪φAj ) 6⊃ φAk , for some αj  αn. Then there
is αk s.t. Cn(αj ∪φAi )  αk and αk 2 φAk . Hence, by induction hypothesis
M′ |= φAj and M′ 2 φAk . Because αk  αn ∈ UA, then the hypothesis
αn ∈ UA 2 φAj → φAk is contradicted.
Let us now consider the access operators, which will allow to generalize to
models with different local states:
– If φAi is of the form read(ψ
B
j ): by induction hypothesis read(ψ
B
j ) ∈ αn
means αi ∈ UA  read(ψBj ) for all αi, and βj ∈ UA  ψBj , by model
condition c4; by the canonical model construction A ≤ B, and condition
c10 makes read(ψBj ) holds for all N ≥ A, hence M′  read(ψBj ). For the
opposite direction: assumeM′  read(ψBj ): then it must be the case that
for every A ∈ A, ∃αi  βj s.t αi ∈ UA ` read(ψBj ), hence B ≥ A, and
as this holds for any arbitrary αi up to αn, the left-to-right implication
holds.
– If φAi is of the form trust(ψ
B
j ): by induction hypothesis, αn ∈ UA 
trust(ψBj ) and βj ∈ UA  ψBj ; by the canonical model construction A ≤
B, and by the definition of the operator there is αj  αn such that αn =
Cn(αi ∪ ψBj ). As this holds for any arbitrary αj satisfying the previous
assumptions, then M′  trust(ψBj ). For the opposite direction: assume
M′  trust(ψBj ): then αi ∈ UA  trust(ψBj ) for any arbitrary αi for
which read(ψBj ), hence for αn.
– If φAi is of the form write(ψ
B
j ): this follows directly from the previous
case.
– If φAi is of the form dtrust(ψ
B
j ): for the left-to-right direction, this follows
from αi ∈ UA  trust(¬ψBj ), for some αi  αn and some βi  αi s.t
βi ∈ UA  trust(ψBj ), but such that ∃βj  βi ∈ UA  dtrust(ψBj ): in
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this case, remodulate UA so as to obtain the filter model which includes
bj and purges bi; for the right-to-left direction, pick the filter model ofM
which satisfies trust(ψBj ) and such that for some βi ∈ UA  trust(ψBj ) is
purged.
– If φAi is of the form mtrust(ψ
B
j ): for the left-to-right direction, this follows
from αi ∈ UA  trust(¬ψBj ), for some αi  αn and some βi  αi s.t
βi ∈ UA  trust(ψBj ), but such that ∃βj  βi and βj ∈ UA  trust(¬ψBj ):
in this case remodulate U i so as to obtain the filter model which includes
bj and purge bi; for the right-to-left direction, pick the filter model of M
which satisfies trust(ψBj ) for some βi such that βi ∈ UA  trust(ψBj ) is
purged.
Theorem 4.6 (Completeness). If M′  φAi , then there is a branch of a deriva-
tion tree in (un)SecureND terminating in ΓA ` φBi , for some A ≤ B.
Proof. By contradiction, assume αj ∈ UA  φAi for every αj  ω1 and every
ΛI ∈ UA in the class of filter models M′ of M of interest, but ΓA 0 φAi in
(un)SecureND. Then there must be a state ω1  αi  αj and αi ∈ UA of M
such that αi |= φAi . Now construct a relevant canonical filter model M′ from
Definition 4.4: φAi will be distrusted or mistrusted and therefore the relevant
state αi will have been purged from the given filter model M′ of M. Hence, it
will not hold at αn and hence is not true in M′ and cannot be valid.
5 Discussion
In logic, trust has been object of many analyses, see e.g. Castelfranchi and Fal-
cone (2010), most of them semantic ones, much less proof-theoretically. Also,
most of them agree on the fact that trust is a form of the truster’s belief in
some trustee’s property. Studies range from computational settings inspired by
applications like security and access control, to more philosophically inspired
problems. In the Bell-LaPadula Model (BLPM, Bell and LaPadula (1973)) a
subject can read resources if the content’s access group is dominated by the
subject’s access group (“no read up”), and can write only resources whose ac-
cess group dominates the subject’s access group (“no write down”); a trusted
subject is allowed to violate the writing constraint above, if it is not against se-
curity by design. A domination relation among subjects (or groups of subjects)
defines therefore the possibility for one to access by writing or reading resources
from another subject. Trust is simply intended as a property of agents, while
security is a property of the system defined independently of the former. In the
Role Based Access Control security model (RBAC, Ferraiolo, Sandhu, Gavrila,
Kuhn, and Chandramouli (2001)), subjects on lower integrity levels are not per-
mitted to write resources on higher integrity levels (“no write up”); and subjects
on higher integrity levels cannot be corrupted by accessing resources on lower
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integrity levels (“no read down”). Trustworthiness of resources corresponds to
prevention of unauthorized change. Trust-aware RBAC models have been re-
cently explored, in which trustworthiness is either defined by temporal-spatial
constraints (e.g. Bertino, Bonatti, and Ferrari (2001); Suroop Mohan Chandran
(2005)), level-constraints (S. Chakraborty and Ray (2006)) or by explicitly re-
quiring role related assessments based on the behavior history of the user, see
e.g. Oleshchuk (2012) for a subjective logic model. A constrained transitive
trust model for the latter logic is also offered in Jøsang and Pope (2005). In au-
thentication logics, starting with Abadi, Burrows, Lampson, and Plotkin (1993),
beliefs are explicitly used: its says modality for principals can be interpreted to
include a trust relation, as fully explored in Genovese (2012), with application to
a distributed setting, see Barker and Genovese (2011).Trust, and its transitivity,
is treated by means of a modal logic approach in Demolombe (2004, 2011, 2017);
Lorini and Demolombe (2009), by specifying several kinds of trustee’s proper-
ties which are relevant in the context of communication. Another modal logic
approach to trust is presented in Liau (2003), where a combination of belief,
information acquisition and trust are modelled semantically and axiomatically:
in this logic, Bi(w) is the set of worlds that agent i considers possible under
world w according to her belief; Iij(w) is what the agent i considers possible
according to the information received from j; and for any S ⊆ W , S ∈ Tij(w)
indicates that agent i trusts j’s judgement on the truth of the proposition cor-
responding to S. The three operators are axiomatically related: information
received from a source reputed trustworthy about that content is believed; and
a source reputed trustworthy about that content is believed to be such; more-
over, if an agent trusts another agent’s judgement on some content, then her
trust is independent of the syntactic form of that content. Trust is characterised
by some useful properties: if an agent acquires contradictory information from
two sources, then sche cannot be trusting both; if one source is at least as trust-
worthy as the other, then the latter is not trusted; trust is not closed under
consequence, nor distributivity of conjunction, but trust of finer content can
be extracted from negative trust on more expressive contents; here there is no
distinction between different forms of negative trust: in fact, a particular aspect
of this logic (differing from ours) is that agents can be trust both on positive for-
mulas and their negative, irrespective of the current state of the trusting agent
or any order on local states. Finally, here the problem of transitivity is treated
in the form of transferability: if i believes that j trusts k, then i will also trust
k due to the endorsement of j, which is considered different from strict trust
transitivity, because it is expressed relatively to an actual belief and information
transmission. This notion of trust shares with ours the assumption that agents
are honest with respect to the information they share; but it differs from ours in
that we do not force trusted contents to hold in the universe (i.e. across different
local states: obviously, in our system if there are two local states with contra-
dictory contents holding, in the filter model of a universe only one such content
will be holding; note that a different filter model might be designed where the
opposite content holds). The problem of trust transitivity has been largely
discussed in the literature, see e.g. P. S. Chakraborty and Karform (2012);
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Christianson and Harbison (1996); Jamali and Ester (2010); Jøsang, Marsh,
and Pope (2006). Solutions include decentralised trust (Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes (1997)), bounded-transitivity in authorization contexts (Chapin, Skalka,
and Wang (2008)), and a constraint by guarantors in Clarke et al. (2009). Tran-
sitivity of trust is also analysed in the context of cryptographic applications, see
e.g. Maurer and Schmid (1996). Trust is defined as occurrent and dispositional
in a logic of time, action, beliefs and choices in Herzig, Lorini, Hu¨bner, and
Vercouter (2010).
Recently, research has started considering the different meanings of nega-
tive trust (Guha, Kumar, Raghavan, and Tomkins (2004); Marsh and Dibben
(2005); McKnight and Chervany (2000); McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury
(2003); Ziegler and Lausen (2005)). In the social sciences, distrust is response
to lack of information and mistrust is former trust destroyed or healed, see
Cvetkovich (1999); Cvetkovich and Lofstedt (1999); Sztompka (1999). The con-
textual account of Marsh and Dibben (2005) presents mistrust as misplaced
trust, untrust as little trust and distrust as no trust. This approach designs
a continuum between the positive and negative evaluations (with some blurry
limit at trust value zero) but it abstracts from the reasons behind the attribution
of these evaluations, in favour of a purely quantitative approach. On the other
hand, it clearly refers to intentions when it distinguish between misplacement
of trust and betrayal. Another account of misplaced trust is provided in Singh
(2011). This work formulates trust as a generic modality not directly related to
information or belief, although constrained by commitments and beliefs. Trust
is defined by a possible worlds semantics, while commitments are expressed as
abstractions; a notion of reality in the world is used to express a specific path of
execution in the multi-agent setting of the semantics. In this way, well-placed
trust means trust in a proposition occurring in a real path across worlds; neg-
ative trust is reduced to misplaced trust, which on the contrary means trust
in a proposition which does not occur in a real path. Note that in this case
the trustee is not responsible for failing to deliver the content of the trusted
proposition, as commitment wa snot necessarily formulated. This is a substan-
tial difference with our system, where the trustor can apply different negative
trust strategies, for example on the assumption that the trustee as the source
of information is intentionally betraying the trustor’s trust.
In fields like Human-Computer Interaction and Cyber-Physical Systems, the
intentional requirement on trust emerges more clearly. In Hoffman et al. (2009),
a scale is considered:
unjustified trust (antitrust) → justified trust (skeptical) → condi-
tional trust (contingent) → unconditional trust (faith)
Among the few semantic formal models that present a similar scalar understand-
ing of trust is A. Baltag and Smets. (2012), where the informational stance of
an agent is dependent from her attitude towards the source of information, en-
coded as strategies for belief change. Propositional attitudes are distinguished
among (Irrevocable) knowledge, (Simple) belief, Strong belief, Triviality and
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Inconsistency, to each of which corresponds an upgrade of the knowledge state
translated into a dynamic attitude:
isolation → neutrality → semi-positive minimal trust → minimal
trust → strong trust → infallible trust
The logic of negative trust (un)SecureND introduced in this work is formu-
lated in a general proof-theoretic format, comprehensive of structural rules, a
semantics, and meta-theoretical results. The proof-theoretic fragment of the
logic has also been presented in a number of more constrained and application-
oriented formats. A first application of (un)SecureND has been to the context
of software management. In Boender, Primiero, and Raimondi (2015), we con-
sidered security threats in software installation processes, posed by transitively
trusted dependencies between packages from distinct repositories. To analyse
them, a Coq implementation has been defined, using an explicit trust function
to bridge repository access and software package installation rights and for veri-
fication of its formal correctness. Thereby, we resolve a version of the minimum
install problem under trust conditions on repositories. In Primiero and Boen-
der (2017, 2018) we extended the analysis to negative trust as considered in the
present paper to analyse the complementary issue of packages’ removal, both in
case of conflicts and of security issues. We identify packages that are undesirable
in view of the current installation profile; and currently installed packages that
become inconsistent with a new intended installation. That formulation differs
from the present more general format in that the access rules are completed by
a ¬−distribution rule, essential to preserve completeness across the positive and
negative fragments of the language: it ensures that if an operation is not possible
on a formula φBi under context Γ
A, then the same operation must be possible
for a contradictory formula in that same context. This formula implements a
closed-world assumption: it assumes that the set of atomic formulas on which
operations can be performed is finite and defined for every agent, and that each
agent can explicitly formulate the operations allowed on each formula. While
this rule indicates a logic stronger than intuitionistic, the system in the current
formulation remains weaker than classical: the operational rules from Figure 2
are inspired by intuitionistic connective, and for the operational rules of Figure
3 double negation elimination cannot hold, as ¬¬Trust(φ) can be inferred from
the two distinct protocols of distrust and mistrust. A second variant of our cal-
culus of negative trust dubbed SecureNDsim has been applied to contradictory
information transmissions in networks, presented in Primiero, Raimondi, Bot-
tone, and Tagliabue (2017). The networks of interest are built by ranked agents
with different epistemic attitudes. In this context, positive trust is a property of
the communication between agents required when message passing is executed
bottom-up in the hierarchy, or as a result of a sceptic agent checking informa-
tion. These two situations are associated with a confirmation procedure that
has an epistemic cost. Negative trust results from refusing verification, either of
contradictory information or because of a lazy attitude. The procedural seman-
tics of the logic is implemented in a NetLogo simulation to test experimentally
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its formal properties. Results suggest that a sceptic approach is favourable when
maximisation of consensus is the goal; a lazy approach should be pursued when
minimisation of costs is the goal. Ranking of initial nodes is only of little rele-
vance to consensus reaching, while a rigidly structured network (linear) is the
most expensive in this respect. Finally, the experimental analysis shows that
trust is a better mean to information propagation than distrust. The presence of
contradictory information is by itself the cause of distrust generation, indepen-
dently from the initial attitude of the agents. The format of SecureNDsim can
be further explored in view of different types of agents (e.g. paranoid agents,
distrusting all information coming from an agent higher in the hierarchy). The
general format of the logic abstracts away from both epistemic attitudes and
networks of information transmission, relying only on the access relation defined
across agents. Finally, a last field of application for our logic of negative trust has
been communication protocols in vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET). In the
context of such networks, security requirements need to rely on a combination
of reputation of communicating agents and trust relations over the messaging
framework. This is crucial in order to maintain dynamic and safe behaviour
under all circumstances. In Primiero, Raimondi, Chen, and Nagarajan (2017)
we have adapted the logic to a reputation and trust model for VANETs, exploit-
ing its formal verification through the existing translation into the Coq proof
assistant, so as to guarantee consistency of messaging protocols and security of
transitive transmissions. In Primiero, Martorana, and Tagliabue (2018) we fo-
cused on the networks’ vulnerability to attacks by malicious users. Despite their
characterization as dynamically reconfigurable networks, for security reasons it
is nonetheless essential to identify topology and population properties that can
optimise mitigation protocols’ deployment. We have provided an algorithmic
definition and simulation of a trust and mitigation based protocol inspired by
(un)SecureND to contain a Black Hole style attack, i.e. one where malicious
agents divert all the traffic toward themselves without forwarding the (non-
malicious) data packets to the neighbouring nodes. We experimentally showed
its optimal working conditions using repeated broadcasting, opportunistic mes-
sage forwarding and testing on real data. This application, in particular, relies
on the configuration of several agents acting as purposefully distrustful ones, to
implement a common strategy. The variety of applications and different con-
texts in which we have modelled (un)SecureND shows the general nature of the
trust protocol it expresses, as formulated in the present paper.
We have stressed that the semantics of negative trust implemented by (un)SecureND
can be seen as non-deterministic. Its resolution corresponds to the problem of
defining strategies to establish which negative trust operation should an agent
perform when faced with a message that fails the consistency check in the trust
rule. This corresponds to establish under which conditions an agent should
perform revision on her own belief base, or when she should reject incoming
information. The extension of (un)SecureND presented in Ceolin and Prim-
iero (2019) offers a number of such strategies based on calculating a value of
trustworthiness for each source, and partitioning such set for each receiver into
higher and lower ranked sources. In this case, a measure of trustworthiness for
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each profile is computed as a function of three parameters:
– Knowledgeability : the number of profiles accessible from an agent’s profile
A.
– Popularity : the number of sources having access to A.
– Reputation: the proportion between trust and negative trust operations
on formulas indexed by A.
On the basis of an initial computational evaluation of such notion of trust-
worthiness, different strategies are proposed to establish further negative trust
strategies by any agent; for all of them, consider the set of agents profiles with
trustworthiness higher than the profile currently involved in an inconsistent
reading operation:
– distrust: an agent distrusts received content if sent from a source with
lower trustworthiness;
– weak mistrust: the agent accepts incoming information and removes from
its own profile any conflicting information by the simple presence of the
sender in the set of sources with higher reputation;
– majority mistrust: requires computing the partitions of the set of sources
with higher trustworthiness than A and comparing their cardinality: any
content held by the larger partition will be kept by the receiver (including
the case in which this reduces to an application of a distrust rule);
– weighted majority: the essential condition is expressed by the higher av-
erage reputation of the partition.
– complete mistrust: the agent requires that every element in the set of
sources with higher reputation agrees on the received message to accept
it and remove conflicting information on her own profile.
This assessment is used to model a real-case scenario of source assessment
to decide the agent position in an online debate, and the selection strategies are
applied to the resulting source hierarchy. We show that a linear combination of
these parameters presents a decent correlation with user-provided assessments.
6 Conclusions
We have presented the logic (un)SecureND, its proof theory, with a number of
structural properties, its relational semantics and soundness and completeness
results.
The main limitation of the logic (un)SecureND as developed so far is its
binary treatment of trust. A more interestingly and dynamic extension of the
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logic can be formulated through a probabilistic assessment of source trustworthi-
ness. Starting from the existing model of trustworthiness assessment developed
in Ceolin and Primiero (2019), we aim at providing first a probabilistic method
to reason systematically on the trustworthiness of information sources. While
semantic approaches and constraints on sharing abilities of online platforms are
difficult and inconvenient, such a method would focus on determining which
information sources are most trustworthy, by reasoning on their knowledgeabil-
ity, popularity and reputation. This model can be further implemented in a
distributed ledger structure for trustworthiness assessment in public debates,
developing the DAG structure considered in Bottone, Raimondi, and Primiero
(2018). The blockchain technology seems not to have yet been tested in this
context. The ledger can provide opinion debates with a register which accounts
for previously held positions by participants, maintaining a traceable history of
the evolution of the debate; the model guarantees always to each participant
the right to access the debate with a probability which is never zero, at the
same time establishing priority on the basis of an acquired level of trustworthi-
ness; the model grants a dynamic debate, with a revision option for previously
held positions; the structure models a dynamic notion of source trustworthiness,
depending on other agents’ assessments and from the source ability to remain
updated on the opinions available in the debate and it finally requires partici-
pants to the debate to be informed and knowledgeable about other participants’
opinions, thus increasing the overall reliability of the debate.
From the point of view of the semantic analysis of negative trust by (un)SecureND,
one main task is the simplification and generalization of the relational filter
models presented in this paper. One way this could be achieved is by modelling
accessibility and temporality among agents’ states by a unique relation. While
this would undoubtedly simplify the formal treatment of our relations of inter-
est, it would make accessibility dependent from the temporal order. One sort
of applications which could be usefully interpreted by such simplified model are
operations across servers where data accessibility could be temporally restricted,
e.g. in conditions of upgrade or for security reasons.
The development of such models and applications for the probabilistic ex-
tension of (un)SecureND are the next steps of this research.
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